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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JACK B. AND JOANNA M. ZITO,
Plaintiffs,

CaseNo.20010715-CA

vs.
CENDANT MOBILITY SERVICES,
Defendants.
CENDANT MOBILITY SERVICES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CRAIG & KYLIE REAGAN,
Defendants-Appellants.
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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

JURISDICTION
The Order Granting Cendant's Motion for Summary Judgment against the Reagans
and Rule 54(b) Determination was filed August 6, 2001. Reagans filed their Notice of
Appeal on August 29, 2001. The appeal was timely. Utah R. App. P. 22(a). Jurisdiction
was conferred on the Utah Supreme Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 2001),

because the appeal is one over which the Court of Appeals does not have original
jurisdiction. The Utah Supreme Court transferred to Case to the Court of Appeals, as
authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). (Record 227.)

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Were a statute and ordinance regulating the division of land "for the purpose'1

of development violated if the undisputed primary purpose for the division was other than
development although there was a minor, non-motivating possibility of future building on
the divided land?
In determining whether the trial court properly granted judgment as a matter of law
to the prevailing party, the appellate court reviews the trial court's conclusions for
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's conclusions. Ward v. Richfield City, 798
P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990).
2.

Was summary judgment precluded by a genuine question of fact as to whether

a landowner' s purpose in splitting his property was for purpose of future development, where
the landowner repeatedly testified that his purpose was to take advantage of the lower
interest rates that would result from such a splitting?
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In
determining whether the trial court correctly found that there was no genuine issue of
material fact, the appellate court views the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the
2

light most favorable to the losing party. Hamblin v. Citv of Clearfield. 795 P.2d 1133,1135
(Utah 1990).
3.

Was summary judgment of rescission precluded by a factual dispute as to

whether the buyer could restore the property to the seller in the same condition as received?
Review is for correctness. Id
4.

Does a zoning violation which may limit the use to which property may be put

but which does not completely destroy the value of the property constitutes an encumbrance
warranted against by a warranty deed.
Review is for correctness. Ward, supra.
5.

Does a zoning violation which may limit the use to which property may be put

but which does not completely destroy the value of the property violates the covenant of
good right to convey implicit in a warranty deed.
Review is for correctness. Id.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Copies of the relevant ordinances and statutes are attached in the appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case. This is an appeal from afinaljudgment in a civil action for

rescission of a real estate conveyance.

3

B.

Course of proceedings and disposition below.

Zitos filed their complaint against Cendant on April 19, 1999. (Record 18-1.1)
Cendant filed a third-party complaint against Reagans on December 2, 1999. (Record 2726.) The action between Zitos and Cendant was settled and dismissed with prejudice by
order entered July 26,2000. (Record 39.)
Cendant moved for summary judgment against Reagans on May 16,2001. (Record
54-53.) Oral arguments on the motion were held July 18, 2001, and the court granted the
motion.2 (Record 197.) The formal Order Granting Cendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment against the Reagans and Rule 54(b) Determination was filed August 6, 2001.
(Record 201 -199.) The order ruled that there remained factual disputes regarding Cendant's
claim for damages and regarding the Reagans5 claim that Cendant failed to maintain the
property or had an obligation to purchase additional property, but held that was no reason
to delay thefinalityof the order during the pendency of the remaining proceedings and that
it should become final for purposes of appeal. (Record 200.)
Following entry of the summary judgment against Reagans, Reagans filed a thirdparty complaint against First American Title Co.. (Record 206-202.) That matter also
remains pending before the trial court.

*The documents in the trial court record are organized in reverse chronological order, with
the result that the numbering placed on the documents pursuant to Rule 11(b) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure runs in reverse order on each document.
2

Although the minute entry does not reflect it, apparently an oral motion was made at the
hearing to certify the summary judgment as final for purposes of appeal.
4

C.

Statement of Facts.

Craig Reagan purchased an 80 acre parcel of land in Wasatch County, and in 1994
commenced construction of a house on the property. (Record 167-166.) He moved in the
property in November 1994. He got married March 31,1995, and he and his wife used the
house as their primary residence until September 1997 when he was required to move to
Texas in connection with a new job. (Record 165.)
In June 1997, before he had received the new job offer, he learned that he could save
three percent interest on his home loan if the parcel securing the loan was less than 10 acres.
(Record 164.) He contacted the Wasatch County recorder to determine what would be
necessary to split up the property. He was informed that, so long as he did not break the
property into more than three parcels, all he would need would be to obtain a description of
the new parcels and have them recorded with the recorder's office. (Record 163-162.)
Mr. Reagan's purpose in splitting up the property was to reduce the interest rate on
his home. (Record 164.) As long as he was at the process, however, he decided to create an
extra parcel f,[b]ecause I wanted to be able to have the advantage of adding another home
[for my parents] if I ever needed to." (Record 161.)
Mr. Reagan had a surveyor prepare a new legal description with two parcels of
slightly less than 10 acres in addition to the remaining approximately 60 acres. He took the
survey to a title company and asked them to prepare the appropriate deeds for recording with
the county to split the property into three separate parcels. (Record 161.)

5

Sometime in the late summer or fall of 1997 Mr. Reagan received a job offer with
Union Pacific which required his moving to Fort Worth, Texas. Part of the offer included
a relocation benefit to help with the move. (Record 159.) The employer apparently
contracted with HFS Mobility Services, later Cendant Mobility Services, to provide the
relocation benefit, and on November 28, 1997, HFS Mobility Services, Inc. agreed to
purchase the property from Reagans for $375,000. (Record 139-133.) A warranty deed
implementing the purchase was signed in November 1997 and recorded June 5, 1998.
(Record 60-59.)
Jack B. and Joanna M. Zito contracted to purchase the property from Cendant.
(Record 12-1.) On April 19,1999, Zitos filed a complaint alleging that Cendant had refused
to close or convey the property and seeking an award of damages. (Record 18-1.) Cendant,
in turn, filed a third-party complaint against Reagans alleging that Reagans had failed to
obtain legal approval from Wasatch County to "subdivide'1 their property. (Record 27-26.)
Cendant settled the Zito complaint for $25,000, (Record 37-35), but refused to disclose to
Reagans the basis for the settlement nor to give any information concerning damages which
may have been suffered by Zitos. (Record 82, 90-89.)
Reagans moved out of the property in September 1997. (Record 165.) The home has
an HRF heating system which must be kept on during the winter. (Record 158.) Cendant
apparently did not keep the system running, resulting in a crack in a concrete floor in the
garage and apparent damage to the heating system. The deck had not been maintained and
was deteriorated, the house had not been painted, the road had not been maintained and was
6

completely dilapidated and rundown, there were cracks in the tile, a door had been broken
into, and the toilets had apparently been used even though the plumbing was not operable.
(Record 153.)
Cendant filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking rescission. (Record 54-53,
80-57.) Reagans filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit asserting that Cendant had failed to provide
adequate responses to discovery focused on the reasonableness of the settlement with Zitos.
(Record 83-81.) Reagans argued they had not illegally subdivided the property. They also
asserted that rescission was inappropriate because Cendant had allowed the property to be
damaged and therefore could not restore the property to the Reagans. (Record 180-84.)
In the trial court acknowledged that there were factual disputes concerning the extent
of the damage to the property. The court nonetheless held that rescission was appropriate
and granted summary judgment to Cendant, reserving the issue of damages. (Record 201199.) Reagans thereafter perfected this appeal. (Record 211-209.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Summary judgment was not appropriate under the law, and factual issues precluded
summary judgment in any event. The division of property at issue in this case would have
been improper only if it were done for the primary purpose of resale or development. The
undisputed evidence, however, was that the primary purpose of Mr. Reagan in dividing the
property was to lower the interest rate on his home loan. Although Mr. Reagan also had a
vague idea that he might at some indeterminate point in the future use one of the parcels to
7

build a home for his parents, there was no evidence from which the court could have
determined that this was "the" purpose for the property division.
At the very least there was a disputed issue of fact as to what was the purpose for
dividing the property. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Reagans, the evidence
showed that Reagans did not have any intent to develop or resell the property.
Even if the division of the property was improper, it did not breach the warranty
against encumbrances nor the covenant of good right to convey. Any statutory violation did
not create a lien or other charge against the tile. It was clear that Reagans had full right to
actually convey everything the warranty deed stated they conveyed.
Finally, there was an issue of fact as to whether rescission was appropriate. Viewed
in the light most favorable to Reagans, the evidence showed that Cendant had allowed the
property to deteriorate and suffer serious damage, and Cendant could not restore the property
to Reagans in the same condition as it was received. Where restoration of the status quo ante
is impossible, rescission may not be granted. This factual dispute precluded summary
judgment of rescission.

8

ARGUMENT
I:

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS INAPPROPRIATELY
GRANTED WHERE THERE REMAINED A GENUINE
FACTUAL DISPUTE REGARDING CRAIG REAGAN'S
PURPOSE IN DIVIDING HIS LAND.

Relying on section 17-27-804 of the Utah Code and section 16.04.030 of the Wasatch
County Code, Cendant argued below and the trial court held that Reagans illegally
subdivided their property. The definitions of "subdivision" in both the Utah Code and the
Wasatch County Code, however, exclude a division of property which is not for the purpose
of resale or development. This exclusion applies here.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-103(l)(w) defines "subdivision" as "any land that is
subdivided, resubdivided or proposed to be divided into two or more lots, parcels, sites,
units, plots, or other division of landfor the purpose, whether immediate or future, for offer,
sale, lease, or development either on the installment plan or upon any and all other plans,
terms, and conditions." (Italics added.) Wasatch County Code section 16.01.010(97)
similarly defines "subdivision" as "a tract, lot or parcel of land which has been divided into
two or more lots, plots, sites, or other division of lander the purpose, whether immediate
or future, of sale or of building development . . . ." (Italics added.) Neither of these
definitions, therefore, include within the term "subdivision" a division of land which is not
for the purpose of resale or development.
The trial court granted summary judgment on the issue of whether the Reagans' 1997
division of their land into three parcels fell within these definitions. In so ruling, the trial

9

court implicitly held there was no factual dispute that Mr. Reagan's decision to split their 80acre property into three parcels was "for the purpose" of future development. See Record
at 200. The court based this ruling on one selected piece of testimony from Mr. Reagan's
deposition, where he had stated that he "wanted to be able to have the advantage of adding
another home if [he] ever needed to." See kL (citing Record at 161).
In ruling that there was no dispute as to this clearly dispositive question of fact, the
trial court simply disregarded, without explanation, Mr. Reagan's repeated insistence that
his decision to divide his property was in fact based upon an altogether different rationale.
According to Mr. Reagan's testimony in the very same deposition that was relied upon by
the trial court, his decision to divide his property was instead based upon his belief that he
could secure a lower interest rate on his homeowner's loan if the plot on which his home was
being built was 10 acres in size or less. In contrast to the one mention-found on one page
of his deposition-of the desire to parcel out a place where he might possibly build a home
for his parents, Mr. Reagan's repeated insistence that the reason for this division was to get
a better rate on his loan appears on no less than twelve other pages of his deposed testimony.
See Record at pp. 156,161 -164.3 Relevant examples of Mr. Reagan's explanation of the cost
of this loan and the resultant decision to parcel out a ten acre plot to reduce the interest rate
include the following:
Q. Tell me why you decided to split up the property.

3

Encompassing pages 13-20,23, 28, 47-48 of Mr. Reagan's deposition.
10

A. To reduce the interest rate on my home, because the
lot size for a conventional loan needed to be ten acres or under
to drop my interest rate three percent.
Q. Three percent?
A. Correct. So I was trying to drop my interest rate to
get my house payment lower.
Q. Who told you that it would save you three percent?
A. The mortgage companies.
Record at 164.
Q
And sometime in this time frame of June, '97, you
learned that you could lower your rate three percent?
A. Correct
Q. Do you know if you have any documents related to
the June, '97 refinancing still in your files?
A. Did not refinance it in June. We were working
towards that.
Q. All right. Did you ever refinance it?
A. Yes. That's what the whole goal is about
Record at 163 (emphasis added).
Q. Tell me what steps you took to split the property in
the summer of '91.
A. As I learned of this [the lower loan rate available for
parcels that are 10 acres or smaller], I called the County
Recorder and asked them what was required for me to be able
to split my property up.
Record at 163 (emphasis added).
11

Q. Can you tell me why the property that you split up
with the house on it is only 9.5 acres?
A. Just so that it would fall underneath the ten acres but
be close enough to ten to make it a decent size
Record at 160.
Q. Do you remember any discussions with any of the
real estate agents regarding how you split up the property into
ten acre pieces . . . ?
A. I might have with Chris on our listing that, just like
I say, on that same discussion of, hey, we owned 80, we want to
split this thing up to get our interest rate down
Record at 156.
As is clear from this testimony, Mr. Reagan's decision to parcel his 80 acres into three
separate lots was in every way related to his desire to get a lower interest rate on his
homeowners loan. That this was the case is further confirmed by the fact that though Mr.
Reagan had actually purchased the property in 1989, it wasn't until June of 1997, the same
month in which he had learned about the potential 3 point drop in interest rate that was
available to sub-10 acre parcels, that he suddenly decided to divide his land.
The trial court's grant of summary judgment is therefore baffling. In granting
summary judgment on this point, the court ostensibly found that there was no genuine issue
of material fact as to this central question. Given the weight of Mr. Reagan's testimony on
the subject, however, it seems clear that, at the very least, the question of what Mr. Reagan's
purpose was in dividing the property is an open question that needs to be resolved at trial.
In reviewing the trial court's ruling on this point, this Court views all facts and inferences
12

against the prevailing party. This Court is thus required to view the above listed quotes and
facts as meaning what Mr. Reagan insists that they meant all along: that Mr. Reagan's
purpose in dividing his land into three parcels was to secure a lower interest rate on his loan.
The trial court's grant of summary judgment should therefore be reversed.

II.

A DIVISION OF LAND WITH AN UNDEFINED,
UNPLANNED POSSIBILITY OF A FUTURE NONCOMMERCIAL IMPROVEMENT WAS NOT FOR THE
PURPOSE OF "DEVELOPMENT."

The second reason that the trial court's summary judgment should be overturned is
due to the trial court's erroneous interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 7-27-103(l)(w)(i)
(hereafter referred to as ,f§ 103"). As discussed above, this section defines what type of
property divisions are included within the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-804
(hereafter referred to as ,f§ 804,f). The trial court held that § 103 applied to Mr. Reagan's
division of his property and that his resultant failure to comply with § 804 therefore acted
as encumbrance upon the land.4
As noted above, the basis for the trial court's ruling was its determination that "one
of the purposes11 for Mr. Reagan's division of his property was for "the future development"
of the property. See Record at 200. In so ruling, the court ignored both the plain language
and plain meaning of the statute.

4

This discussion applies equally to the Wasatch County ordinances.
13

The text of the statute does not support the broad reading given it by the trial court.
Rather than imposing the requirements of § 804 on all property owners who have mentally
contemplated a possible future division of their property, § 103 strictly limits the application
of § 804 to those who divide the land "for the purpose" of those future developments. The
trial court's grant of summary judgment because future development was ostensibly "one of
the purposes" is an overly broad reading that is not in conformity with the plain language of
the statute. In essence, the trial court's insertion of its own definition-expanding language
has transformed the statute's meaning. Whereas the text of the statute requires at least a
showing of primacy, the trial court's reading could now support a wide variety of potential
inclusions Just so long as it can be shown that those inclusions were "one of the purposes"
for the division.5
The Utah Supreme Court has "repeatedly stated (that) statutes must be construed not
from interpretations of their terms in extraneous contexts, but from 'the plain language of the
Act' itself." Associated General Contractors v. Board of Oil Gas and Mining. 2001 UT112,
^f 27,38 P.3d 291 (citations omitted). Further, "only if there is ambiguity [in a statute] do we
look beyond the plain language to legislative history or policy considerations." Statev.Lusk.
5

In its reply brief on the initial motion for summary judgment, Cendant suggested that this
reading would "create an exception to the subdivision laws that would swallow their
purpose." Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff Cendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment at 5. This argument misses the point of the statute.
According to the express terms of 804, the very purpose of § 103 is to act as a definitional
exemption to the subdivision requirements. See Utah Code Ann. § 804(1) (stating that
"unless exempt under section 17-27-806 or not included in the definition of a subdivision
under subsection 17-27-103(1)", the requirements of § 804 are to apply).
14

2001 UT 102, <p9, 37 P.3d 1103. In the present case, it is thus important to note what this
statute does and does not say. The statute does not say that § 804's requirements apply when
future development is "a purpose'1 or ,fa substantial purpose" or even "one of the purposes."
Section 103 plainly states that § 804 applies when future development is "the purpose" of the
division. A plain language reading of the article "the,"coupled with the fact that "purpose"
is listed as a singular noun, actually seems to indicate that the statute contemplates
application of 804 only when development is the only purpose. Even if one does not
subscribe to such a strict reading of the statute, however, it is nevertheless clear that, given
the restrictive language used in the statute, a degree of primacy of purpose is obviously
required. At the very least, it seems to require something more than an incidental motivation
such as was present here.
In its expansion of § 804fs inclusiveness, the trial court does not at all attempt to
define how much of a factor a motivation has to be in order to be considered "one of the
purposes." The trial court does not tell us, for example, whether a motivation needs to have
been responsible for at least 50% of the decision to divide to be considered "one of the
purposes," or whether even a lesser motivation might suffice. If a particular motivation were
only 40% responsible for the decision to divide, does that qualify? Does a motivation that
was 30% responsible qualify? If the possibility of future development was only 5%
responsible for the decision to divide, is that sufficient to be considered "one of the
purposes," thereby requiring registration of the plat? The statute plainly requires the

15

registration of a plat whenever development is "the purpose" of the property division. That
language is simply not as inclusive as the trial court's ruling would suggest.
Further, it is not even clear that Mr. Reagan had any purpose to further develop his
land, let alone having such future development as the purpose. As noted above, Mr. Reagan
has made it clear that the division of his land was based upon a desire to lower the interest
rate on his loan. In ruling that this was not "the purpose" of his division, the trial court
erroneously relied upon his statement that he "wanted to be able to have the advantage of
adding another home if he ever needed to." Explaining this, Mr. Reagan noted that "(his)
parents had talked about moving up there some day," and that, since he was already dividing
the property anyways, he thought that he would go ahead and make the change now so as to
be able to avoid having to redivide his land again if his parents ever actually decided to
move. Record at 161.
Something that is a "purpose" acts as a motivator. In order to rule that the "purpose"
of the division was for future development, one would have to conclude that Mr. Reagan
took the steps necessary to divide his land because o/his desire to possibly build for his
parents. This simply isn't the case. As the sole owner of the 80 acres, Mr. Reagan did not
need to divide his property in order to build a house for his parents. The land was already
his, and, subject to zoning laws, he could have built on it at will. If not for the fact that he
was already engaged in the division process due to his own interest in procuring a lower
loan, it seems clear that there would have been no division of the land in the summer of
1997.
16

Had Mr. Reagan started preparing the land for the building of his parents' home, that
might indicate that there was a purpose for a future development. Had Mr. Reagan run water
or power over to that spot, that might indicate that there was a purpose for a future
development. Had Mr. Reagan had the land appraised for such a building, that might
indicate that there was a purpose for such a development. Had Mr. Reagan and his parents
decided on a date or year in which they would move to that spot, that might indicate that
there was a purpose for a such a development. Had Mr. Reagan's parents even affirmatively
made up their minds that they were in fact going to move to that spot, then that decision
might be said to have acted as a "purpose" in Mr. Reagan's redivision of his land. None of
this had happened, however.6 Instead, at the time that Mr. Reagan decided to subdivide his
land, his parents had made no decision as to when or even if they would move onto his
property. His decision to parcel out a spot for them while in the midst of his own division
of property therefore seems to be nothing more than an incidental act done to make more
convenient a decision that had not yet even been made. Would Mr. Reagan have divided his
property in June 1997 in the absence of any potential plans to move his parents? Yes, to take
advantage of a lower interest rate on his bank loan. Would Mr. Reagan have divided his
property in the absence of that potentially lower bank loan, just to make easier the still
unplanned, long "talked about" potential move of his parents? No.

6

Indeed, to this day, Mr. Reagan's parents have still not decided whether they will ever
move up to a spot on his property.
17

This Court should hold that the purpose requirement of § 804 at least requires a
showing of motivated primacy. The grant of summary judgment should be reversed.

Ill:

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF RESCISSION WAS
IMPROPER WHERE THERE WERE FACTUAL
DISPUTES CONCERNING WHETHER CENDANT
COULD RESTORE THE PROPERTY TO STATUS QUO.

Two elementary rules of rescission are that it is an equitable remedy available only
when a remedy at law is unavailable, and even in equity rescission is not available if the
parties cannot be placed in status quo ante. 50 West Broadway Associates v. Redevelopment
Agency of Salt Lake Citv. 784 P.2d 1162,1170-71 (Utah 1989); Coalville City v. Lundgren.
930 P.2d 1206, 1210 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Neither requirement was met here.
The trial court acknowledged that factual disputes existed as to the amount of damage
to the property. (Record 200.) Reagans presented evidence of significant damage to the
property, including a cracked floor which apparently damaged the heating system and a
generally deteriorated condition of the property. (E.g., Record 153.) Where there was a
dispute as to the amount and extent of the damage, it is difficult to understand how the trial
court could have concluded, as a matter of law, that Reagans could be placed back in status
quo ante.
By the same logic, if the damages were such that Reagans could be placed back in
status quo, then Cendant had an adequate remedy at law. Cendant's position in this
transaction was solely to fulfill a contractual requirement to purchase and then resell
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Reagans' property-the property had no intrinsic value to Cendant. If the zoning problems
impacted the resale value and were legally actionable, then Cendant's remedy was an action
at law on the contract or on the warranty deed.
Because there was an adequate remedy at law, and a dispute as to whether Reagans
could be placed in status quo, rescission was improper.

IV:

EVEN IF THERE WAS AN IMPROPER SUBDIVISION,
IT DID NOT BREACH ANY WARRANTY OF THE
WARRANTY DEED.
Reagans conveyed title to Cendant by warranty deed. The trial court held the

sale to Cendant "violated that warranties in the Reagans' deed to Cendant of the right to sell
and the covenant against encumbrances." (Record 200.) Holmes Development. LLC v.
Cook. 2002 UT 38, decided after the trial court's ruling, establishes there was no breach of
the warranty deed.
A.

There was no breach of the covenant of good right to convey because Reagans
conveyed good title.

Holmes stated that "if a warranty deed comports with Utah law, then the five
covenants of title articulated therein implicitly apply to the real property conveyance: (1) the
covenant of seisin, (2) the covenant of right to convey, (3) the covenant against
encumbrances, (4) the covenant of warranty, and (5) the covenant of quiet enjoyment." Id
f 33. It appears likely the trial court's reference here to the warranty of right to sell was to
the covenant of right to convey. Holmes explained that covenant as follows:
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Similarly, in making the covenant of the right to convey, a
grantor guarantees that the grantor has the legal right to convey
the estate the deed purports to convey. Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-112 (providing that grantor covenants "he has good right to
convey premises11); see also... Seymour [v. Evans], 608 So. 2d
[1141] at 1144 [(Miss. 1992)]. Essentially, the covenants of
seisin and the right to convey are synonymous, and the analysis
of whether a grantor breached one of these covenants is the
same for either covenant.
Hence, the covenants of seisin and right to convey, if
found in a warranty deed, attest that the grantor covenants that
it has good title to the estate purportedly conveyed.
Consequently, the grantor breaches these covenants when it is
shown that the grantor did not own the land that he purported to
convey by the warranty deed description.
Holmes. 2002 UT 38.fflf34-35 (some citations omitted, quotation marks omitted).
The Seymour case cited by the Utah Supreme Court considered whether the
conveyance of an illegally subdivided lot breached the covenants of seisen and good right
to convey. The court rejected that claim, holding that "a deed which runs afoul of
subdivision regulations is perfectly valid despite the violation." 608 So.2d at 1145.
Because Reagans owned the land sold to Cendant and validly conveyed everything
they owned, there was no breach of the covenant of good right to convey.
B.

A zoning restriction is not an encumbrance.

Holmes Development LLC v. Cook. 2002 UT 38, summarized the law regarding the
covenant against encumbrances as follows:
A grantor in a warranty deed in Utah warrants to the grantee,
among other things, that the premises are free from all
encumbrances.. .. This court has defined an encumbrance as
"any interest in a third person consistent with a title in fee in the
20

grantee, if such outstanding interest injuriously affects the value
of the property," or "constitutes a burden or limitation upon the
rights of the fee title holder."
2002 UT 38, Tf 44 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
The claimed statutory violation here was not an interest in a third person, and
therefore was not an encumbrance. In Ellis v. Hale. 13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382 (1962),
the Utah Supreme Court considered a claim for damages arising out of a claimed illegal
subdivision. The seller prepared a subdivision plat, but it was never approved nor recorded.
Notwithstanding the lack of approval or recording, the seller sold four lots in the purported
subdivision. The city refused to grant building permits to the buyers because of the illegal
subdivision. The buyers sued the seller, but the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure
to state a cause of action. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed.
As in this case, the buyers in Ellis claimed the seller violated the county ordinance
and state statutes. The Utah Supreme Court rejected this claim, noting that the ordinance and
statutes "impose a duty running to the sovereign, and a violation thereof does not necessarily
give rise to civil liability." 373 P.2d at 384.
The Ellis court did not address whether the illegal subdivision also breached any of
the warranties in a warranty deed, because the issue was not raised in the complaint. A
recent Idaho Supreme Court decision has squarely addressed this issue. Hoffer v. Callister.
Docket No. 27077,2002 Idaho LEXIS 71 (May 6,2002). Hoffer purchased a mobile home
park which had 27 mobile home spaces. A few years thereafter, Hoffer discovered that the
zoning regulations only allowed 16 mobile home spaces and brought suit against his vendors.
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As an instant case, there was no claim that any of the defendants were aware of the zoning
restrictions nor that they made any representation of the contrary in the sale documents.
The Hoffer court noted that the Idaho statutes defined encumbrances as including
"taxes, assessments, and all liens upon real property." The court held that nothing in this
definition or in other Idaho cases would support holding the zoning violations were
encumbrances.
The Idaho statute and cases are consistent with decisions of the Utah Supreme Court.
The Court has defined "encumbrance" as "any right that a third party holds in land which
constitutes a burden or limitation upon the rights of the fee title holder." Bergstrom v.
Moore. 677 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1984). Accord Brewer v. Peatross. 595 P.2d 866, 868
(Utah 1979); Boothe v. Wvatt 54 Utah 550, 183 P. 323, 324 (1919). With a statutory
violation, there is no "third party" who holds a right in the land. As explained by Ellis v.
Hale. 13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382, 384 (1962), subdivision regulations impose a duty
running to the sovereign, not to private individuals. Reagans did not breach of the covenant
against encumbrances.

CONCLUSION
There is a genuine factual dispute as to whether Mr. Reagan's purpose in dividing his
land was to facilitate future development. Also, the evidence showed the primary purpose
of the division was to obtain a lower interest rate, and not for development. This Court
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should hold that a division of land is for "the purpose" of development only if development
is the primary purpose of the division.
Even if the subdivision was improper, there was no actionable breach of any covenant
of the warranty deed, and rescission was improper because the extent of damage to the
property was disputed.
This Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand for
trial.
DATED this 2Yffay of June, 2002.

DON R. PETERSEN and
/f
U
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing were mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this _2j^~day of June, 2002.
Bruce R. Baird
Baird & Jones, L.C.
201 South Main Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 -2215
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APPENDIX "A"
Order Granting Cendant's Motion for Summary Judgment against the Reagans
and rule 54(b) Determination (R. 201-199)

Bruce R. Baird #0176
Baird & Jones, L. C.
Attorneys for Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Cendant Mobility
201 South Main Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2215
Telephone: (801) 328-1400
Fax:(801)328-1444
Email: brblaw@hqutah.com
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY
JACK B. AND JOANNA M. ZITO,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CENDANT MOBILITY SERVICES
Defendants.

CENDANT MOBILITY SERVICES
Third-Party-Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING CENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST THE REAGANS AND RULE
54(B) DETERMINATION
Civil No.: 990500160
Judge Donald J. Eyre

VD.

CRAIG & KYLIE REAGAN
Third-Party Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on July 18, 2001, the Honorable Donald J. Eyre,
Judge, presiding, pursuant to a Motion by Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Cendant Mobility
Services ("Cendant") pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for Summary
Judgment against Third-Party Defendants Craig and Kylie Reagan ("the Reagans"). Cendant was
represented by its counsel, Bruce R. Baird of Baird & Jones and the Reagans were represented by
their counsel, Don R. Peterson of Howard Lewis & Peterson. The Court reviewed the pleadings
and heard the arguments of counsel. Being thus fully apprised in the matter, the Court hereby

finds that there are no genuine disputes regarding any material issue of fact on the following
matters.
By virtue of his own testimony, Mr. Reagan established that when he split the property he
and Ms. Reagan owned into three pieces one of his purposes for doing so was the future
development of the property. Pursuant to Section 17-27-804, Utah Code Annotated, and Section
16.04.030, Wasatch County Code, this intent required that a subdivision plat be presented to and
approved by Wasatch County. The Reagans failed to meet that requirement and thus the portion
of the Reagans' property sold to Cendant was not a lawful parcel of property. The sale to
Cendant thus violated both State and County law. The sale also violated the warranties in the
Reagans' deed to Cendant of the right to sell and the covenant against encumbrances. Section
57-1-12, U.C.A. The Reagans are not excused from complying with the subdivision laws by
their claimed reliance on the verbal instructions of a functionary employee of Wasatch County.
The breach of the warranties and the illegality of the sale to Cendant renders the sale
void. The proper remedy for the void sale is rescission.
The Court determines that there are or may be factual disputes regarding Cendant's
claims for damages for the Reagans for the amounts that Cendant paid to settle with the Zitos and
for Cendant* s claims for interest on the monies paid to the Reagans for the illegal sale. There
also are or may be factual disputes regarding the claims by the Reagans that Cendant failed to
maintain the property and/or that Cendant has a contractual obligation to purchase the entire 80
acres owned by the Reagans.
The Court specifically finds and determines that there is no just reason for delaying the
finality of this judgment during the pendency of the remaining proceedings and that this
Judgment and Order should become final for the purposes of appeal upon its entry.

Based on the foregoing, the Court enters the following:
ORDER
The sale from the Reagans to Cendant of the property that is the subject of this action is
declared null and void and rescinded. The Reagans are given until August 17, 2001 to file any
counterclaims or any third-party actions related to this matter. All other issues related to this
matter are reserved for further disposition. Pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, this Judgment and Order shall become fmal for the purposes of appeal upon entry.

Don R. Peterson

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this L° day of July, 2001 a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER GRANTING CENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST THE REAGANS was mailed, postage prepaid addressed to the following:
Don R. Peterson
Howard Lewis & Peterson
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 1248
Provo,UT 84603

R. Baird
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Utah Code Ann. §
§

17-27-103.

17-27-103

(2001)

Definitions -- Notice

(1) As used in this chapter:
(a) "Billboard" means a freestanding ground sign located
on industrial, commercial, or residential property if the
sign is designed or intended to direct attention to a
business, product, or service that is not sold, offered, or
existing on the property where the sign is located.
(b) "Chief executive officer" means the person or body
that exercises the executive powers of the county.
(c) "Conditional use" means a land use that, because of
its unique characteristics or potential impact on the county,
surrounding neighbors, or adjacent land uses, may not be
compatible in some areas or may be compatible only if certain
conditions are required that mitigate or eliminate the
detrimental impacts.
(d) "Constitutional taking" has the meaning as defined
in Section 63-34-13.
(e) "County"
county.

means

the

unincorporated

area

of

the

(f) "Elderly person" means a person who is 60 years old
or older, who desires or needs to live with other elderly
persons in a group setting, but who is capable of living
independently.

(g) "Gas corporation'1 has the same meaning as defined
in Section 54-2-1.
(h) (i) "General plan" means a document that a county
adopts that sets forth general guidelines for proposed future
development of the land within the county, as set forth in
Sections 17-27-301 and 17-27-302.
(ii) "General plan" includes what is also commonly
referred to as a "master plan."
(i) "Interstate pipeline company" means a person or
entity engaged in natural gas transportation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 717 et seq.
(j) "Intrastate pipeline company" means a person or
entity engaged in natural gas transportation that is not
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 717 et
seq.
(k) "Legislative body" means the county legislative
body, or for a county that has adopted an alternative form of
government, the body exercising legislative powers.
(1) "Lot line adjustment" means the relocation of the
property boundary line between two adjoining lots with the
consent of the owners of record.
(m) "Municipality" means a city or town.
(n) "Nonconforming structure" means a structure that:
(i) legally
designation; and

existed

before

its

current

zoning

(ii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not
conform with the zoning regulation's setback, height
restrictions, or other regulations that govern the structure.
(o) "Nonconforming use" means a use of land that:
(i) legally
designation;

existed

before

its

current

zoning

(ii) has been maintained continuously since the time
the zoning regulation governing the land changed; and

(iii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not
conform with the zoning regulations that now govern the land.
(p) "Official map" has the same meaning as provided in
Section 72-5-401.
(q) "Person"
means
an
individual,
corporation,
partnership, organization, association, trust, governmental
agency, or any other legal entity.
(r) "Plat" means a map or other graphical representation
of lands being laid out and prepared in accordance with
Section 17-27-804.
(s) "Record of survey map" means a map of a survey of
land prepared in accordance with Section 17-23-17.
(t) (i) "Residential facility for elderly persons" means
a single-family or multiple-family dwelling unit that meets
the requirements of Part 5 and any ordinance adopted under
authority of that part.
(ii) "Residential facility for elderly persons" does
not include a health care facility as defined by Section 2621-2.
(u) "Special district" means all entities established
under the authority of Title 17A, Special Districts, and any
other governmental or quasi-governmental entity that is not
a county, municipality, school district, or unit of the
state.
(v) "Street" means public rights-of-way, including
highways, avenues, boulevards, parkways, roads, lanes, walks,
alleys,
viaducts,
subways,
tunnels, bridges, public
easements, and other ways.
(w) (i) "Subdivision" means any land that is divided,
resubdivided or proposed to be divided into two or more lots,
parcels, sites, units, plots, or other division of land for
the purpose, whether immediate or future, for offer, sale,
lease, or development either on the installment plan or upon
any and all other plans, terms, and conditions.
(ii) "Subdivision"
includes
the
division
or
development of land whether by deed, metes and bounds

description, devise and testacy, lease, map, plat, or other
recorded instrument.
(iii) "Subdivision" does not include:
(A) a bona
fide division
or
agricultural land for agricultural purposes;

partition

of

(B) a recorded agreement between owners
adjoining properties adjusting their mutual boundary if:

of

(I) no new lot is created; and
(II) the adjustment does not
violation of applicable zoning ordinances;

result

in

a

(C) a recorded document, executed by the owner of
record, revising the legal description of more than one
contiguous parcel of property into one legal description
encompassing all such parcels of property; or
(D) a bona fide division or partition of land in
a county other than a first class county for the purpose of
siting, on one or more of the resulting separate parcels:
(I) an unmanned facility appurtenant to a
pipeline owned or operated by a gas corporation, interstate
pipeline company, or intrastate pipeline company; or
(II) an unmanned telecommunications, microwave,
fiber
optic,
electrical,
or
other
utility
service
regeneration,
transformation,
retransmission,
or
amplification facility.
(iv) The joining of a subdivided parcel of property
to another parcel of property that has not been subdivided
does not constitute a "subdivision" under this Subsection
(1) (w) as to the unsubdivided parcel of property or subject
the unsubdivided
parcel
to
the
county's
subdivision
ordinance.
(x) "Unincorporated" means the area outside
incorporated boundaries of cities and towns.
(2) (a) A county meets the requirements
notice required by this chapter if it:
least

of

of

the

reasonable

(i) posts notice of the hearing or meeting in at
three public places within the jurisdiction and

publishes notice of the hearing or meeting in a newspaper of
general circulation in the jurisdiction, if one is available;
or
(ii) gives actual notice of the hearing or meeting.
(b) A county legislative body may enact an ordinance
establishing stricter notice requirements than those required
by this Subsection (2).
(c) (i) Proof that one of the two forms of notice
authorized by this Subsection (2) was given is prima facie
evidence that notice was properly given.
(ii) If notice given under authority of this section
is not challenged as provided in Section 17-27-1001 within 30
days from the date of the meeting for which the notice was
given, the notice is considered adequate and proper.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 17-27-103, enacted by L. 1991, ch. 235, §
58; 1992, ch. 23, § 25; 1993, ch. 227, § 150; 1995, ch.
179, § 8; 1997, ch. 90, § 1; 1997, ch. 108, § 5; 1997, ch.
151, § 3; 1998, ch. 89, § 2; 1999, ch. 139, § 1; 1999, ch.
291, § 4; 2000, ch. 34, § 4; 2000, ch. 209, § 9; 2001, ch.
66, § 1; 2001, ch. 241, § 30.
NOTES:
AMENDMENT NOTES. --The 1997 amendment by ch. 90, effective
May 5, 1997, deleted "or of commercial, manufacturing, or
industrial land for commercial, manufacturing or industrial
purposes"
from
the
end
of
Subsection
(1) (r) (iii) (A)
(Subsection (1)(p)(iii)(A) of the reconciled version).
The 1997 amendment by ch. 108, effective May 5, 1997,
deleted definitions of "handicapped person" and "residential
facility for handicapped persons," redesignating subsections
accordingly, and made a stylistic change. For present
provisions covering residences for persons with disabilities,
see § 17-27-605.
The 1997 amendment by ch. 151, effective May 5, 1997,
added
Subsections
(1) (r) (iii) (B) and
(C)
(which are
Subsections
(1) (p) (iii) (B) and
(C) in the reconciled
version).

The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, added
Subsection (1)(p)(iv).
The 1999 amendment by ch. 139, effective May 3, 1999,
added Subsections (1) (f) , (1) (h) , (1) (i) , and (1) (s) (iii) (D)
(Subsections (1) (g) , (1) (i) , (l)(j), and (1) (t) (iii) (D) in
the reconciled version), redesignating the other subsections
accordingly and making related changes.
The 1999 amendment by ch. 291, effective May 3, 1999,
added Subsection (1)(d), making related designation changes
and updating the internal references.
The 2000 amendment by ch. 34, effective May 1, 2000,
rewrote the definition of "official map" in Subsection
(1) (p) .
The 2000 amendment by ch. 209, effective May 1, 2000,
added Subsections (1) (q) to (1) (s) , redesignating former
Subsections (1) (q) to (1) (u) as (1) (t) to (1) (x) and making
one related change.
The 2001 amendment by ch. 66, effective April 30, 2001,
added Subsection (1) (w) (iii) (D) (II) and made related
changes.
The 2001 amendment by ch. 241, effective April 30, 2001,
in Subsection (1)(b) substituted "person or body that
exercises the executive powers of the county" for "county
executive, or if the county has adopted an alternative form
of government, the official who exercises the executive
powers."
This section has been reconciled by the Office of
Legislative Research and General Counsel.
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Utah Code Ann. §
§

17-27-804.

17-27-804

(2001)

Plats required

(1) Unless exempt under Section 17-27-806 or not included
in the definition of a subdivision under Subsection 17-27103(1), whenever any lands are divided, the owner of those
lands shall have an accurate plat made of them that sets
forth and describes:
(a) all the parcels of ground divided, by
their
boundaries, course, and extent, and whether they are intended
for streets or other public uses, together with any areas
that are reserved for public purposes; and
(b) the lot or unit reference, the block or building
reference, the street or site address, the street name or
coordinate address, the acreage or square footage for all
parcels, units, or lots, and the length and width of the
blocks and lots intended for sale.
(2) (a) The owner of the land shall acknowledge the plat
before
an
officer
authorized
by
law
to
take
the
acknowledgement of conveyances of real estate.
(b) The surveyor making the plat shall certify it.
(c) The county executive shall approve the plat as
provided in this part. Before the county executive may
approve a plat, the owner of the land shall provide the
county executive with a tax clearance indicating that all
taxes, interest, and penalties owing on the land have been
paid.
(3) After the plat has been acknowledged, certified, and
approved, the owner of the land shall record it in the county

recorder's office in the county in which the lands platted
and laid out are situated.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 17-27-804, enacted by L. 1991, ch. 235, §
97; 1994, ch. 17, § 1; 1995, ch. 181, § 3; 1997, ch. 151,
§ 4; 1998, Ch. 13, § 12; 2000, ch. 209, § 10; 2001, ch.
241, § 36.
NOTES:
AMENDMENT NOTES. --The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997,
inserted "or not included in the definition of a subdivision
under Subsection 17-27-103 (1) (r) " in Subsection (1).
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, updated the
second section reference in Subsection (1).
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, rewrote
Subsection (1)(b) and deleted "map or" before "plat" in the
second sentence of Subsection (2)(c).
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, substituted
"executive" for "legislative body" in Subsection (2) (c) and
made stylistic changes.

APPENDIX "D"
Wasatch County Code 16.01.010(97)

TITLE 16. LAND USE Aiw
DEVELOPMENT
16.01•
16.02.

16.03.

16 . 04.

animals usefux to man or
beast; and includes^gardening
or horticultural fruit
growing, storage and
marketing.
(2) "Agricultural land for
agricultural purposes" means a
tract of land which has been
approved by the Planning
Commission as a tract of
agricultural land for
agricultural purposes in
accordance with Section
16.04.280.
(3) "Bed and Breakfast" Bed
and Breakfast Establishments:
An establishment in a private
dwelling that supplies
temporary accommodations to
overnight guests for a fee.
(4) "Boarding house" means a
building containing sleeping
apartments where meals are
provided from a common kitchen
for compensation pursuant to
previous arrangements on a
daily, weekly, or monthly
basis as distinguished from a
hotel, cafe, or rooming house.
(5) "Bond" means a document
which complies with the
standards contained in Title
16 and binds the parties
thereto to take certain action
if particular conditions are
not met.
(6) "Building" means any
structure built for the
support, shelter, or enclosure
of persons, animals, chattels,
or property of any kind.
(a) "Main building" means one
or more of the principal

Establishment of
Zones
General Development
Standards Applicable
to All Zones
Specific
Requirements for
Zones
Residential
Development

Chapter 16.01. Establishment
of Zones.
16.01.010•
16.01.020.
16.01.030.
16.01.040.
16.01.050.

Definitions.
Violations.
Zones Established.
Official Zone Map.
Boundaries of
Zones•

16.01.010. Definitions.
All terms used in Title 16
which are not specificallydefined herein are to be given
their usual and standard
definition. Disputes as to
the definition of a term not
specifically defined herein
shall be referred to the Board
of Adjustment for resolution.
For purposes of this title:
(1) "Agriculture" is defined
as the act or science of
cultivating the ground, the
act or science of the
production of plants and

16-1
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buildings upon a lot. Garages,
carports and other buildings
which are attached to a
dwelling or other main
building or which are situated
within ten feet of a main
building shall be considered
as a part of the main
building.
(b) "Accessory building" means
a subordinate building more
than ten feet away from any
main building, the use of
which is incidental to that of
a main building.
(7) "Building site" means the
total area covered by a
building, plus a 20 foot strip
around the exterior of the
building, and, if a septic
tank is to serve the building,
such area as is required for
normal functioning of a septic
tank drain field as determined
in accordance with state and
County standards.
(8) "Central sewage disposal
system" means a system of
pipes which collects liquid
waste from two or more
separate and independent
sources and delivers the waste
to an approved common disposal
facility.
(9) "Club/ limited membership"
means a building or other
structures constructed in
accordance with a properly
approved plan and used as an
integral part of a park or
large scale development and
operated by an organized
association of persons for

j social, fraternal, religious,
or patriotic purposes for the
benefit of the members and
guests and not for the general
public, and shall include
eating facilities, club
I administrative offices,
off-street parking and retail
establishments for the sale of
goods and services consumed on
the premises. It shall also
include auxiliary recreational
facilities such as swimming
pools, gymnasiums, tennis,
courts and hunting preserves,
but a limited membership club
shall not include sleeping
accommodations nor facilities
which are open to use by the
general public.
(10) "Common area" means an
area of common ownership
designed to serve the
recreational, open space or
other similar needs of two or
more lots or dwelling units in
separate ownership.
(11) "Comprehensive General
plan" means a coordinated plan
which has been prepared and
adopted by the County for the
purpose of guiding
development, including but not
limited to a plan or plans of
land use, resources,
circulation, housing, and
public facilities and grounds.
' (12) "Conditional Use" means
j a use which has been
specifically permitted by the
terms of this code and which
requires special consideration
by the Board of Adjustment,
6-2
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enterprises.
(16) "Critical angle of
repose" means the degree of
slope at which earth material
at the surface of the ground
moves of its own accord in
response to the force of
gravity.
(17) "Density" means the term
density shall mean the number
of dwelling units and sleeping
apartments per acre of land.
(13) "Density standards" "means
the minimum, maximum and
average lot sizes and the
maximum number of dwelling
units and sleeping apartments
permitted in a planned
recreation development.
(19) "Developer" means any
person or entity proposing to
divide land for the purposes
of selling smaller parcels, or
any person or entity proposing
to change or increase the use
of a tract of land in Wasatch
County.
(20) "Development credit"
means a right or entitlement
to construct a dwelling, which
right or entitlement is
unusable within a zone or
situation but which may be
transferred and used within
another zone or situation.
(21) "Driveway" means a strip
of land not over 100 feet long
designed to serve for access
to one dwelling unit.
(22) "Dwelling" means a one
family dwelling, two-family
dwelling, multiple-family
dwelling, vacation dwelling,

Planning Commission, or County
Commission before a permit
therefor may be issued by the
zoning administrator or
building inspector.
(13) "Condominium unit", or
"condominium11 means a unit in
a condominium project.
(14) "Condominium project"
means a project planned in
accordance with the Utah
Condominium Ownership Act,
including, without limitation",
all units, limited common
area, and common area within
the project.
(15) "Convenience
establishments" means
establishments which are
designed for and intended to
serve the daily or frequent
trade or service needs of
people who reside, visit or
vacation in a particular large
scale development. Such
establishments include cafes,
gasoline service stations,
grocery, variety and drug
stores, coin-operated
laundries and dry-cleaning
establishments, beauty and
barber shops when associated
with a planned residential
development, and sporting
goods,, camera and curio
stores, or a combination
thereof, when associated with
a planned recreation
development; but convenience
establishments do not include
repair garages, automobile
sales yards, wholesale
establishments and other such
16-3
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commercial caretaker's
dwelling, faun caretaker's
dwelling, or industrial
caretaker's dwelling.
(a) "Dwelling unit" means one
or more rooms in a building
designed for living purposes,
that is, bathing, eating, and
sleeping, and occupied b y or
designed for one family.
(b) "One-family dwelling" or
"single-family dwelling" means
a building containing one
dwelling unit.
(c) "Two-family dwelling"
means a building containing
two dwelling units.
(d) "Kultiple-family dwelling"
means a building containing
three or more dwelling units.
(e) "Commercial caretaker's
dwelling" means a building
containing a dwelling unit
which is occupied by an
individual or a family whose
primary responsibility is to
secure the premises and to
perform work thereon which is
incidental to the commercial
use conducted on the premises.
(f) "Farm caretaker's
dwelling" means a building
containing a single dwelling
unit which is located on
agricultural land for
agricultural purposes.
(g) "Industrial caretaker's
dwelling" means a building
containing a dwelling unit
which is occupied by an
individual or a family whose
primary responsibility is to
secure the premises and to

I perfo-ui work thereon which is
incidental to the industrial
use conducted on the premises.
(h) "Vacation dwelling" means
a building containing a
dwelling unit which is only
occupied intermittently by one
or more individuals or
families which are permanently
housed elsewhere or have
permanent dwellings elsewhere.
(23)
"Environment" means the
sum total of the surroundings,
including both natural and
man-made factors.
(24) "Environmental impact
statement" means a statement
describing the impact that a
development will likely have
on the natural features of the
immediate area, and the social
and financial impact, which a
development will likely have
on the County as a whole.
(25) "Family" means an
individual or two or more
persons related by law, blood,
marriage, or adoption, living
together in a single dwelling
unit and maintaining a common
household. Family shall not be
construed to mean a group of
^on-related individuals, a
fraternity, a club, or an
institutional group.
(26) "Family care home" means
a dwelling wherein room,
board, care, and supervision
are provided by the resident
family in a home setting to
persons who are handicapped,
mentally ill, or mentally
retarded and who are provided
6-4
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with County standards.
(32) "Final plat" means a plat
or plats of a large scale
development which has been
prepared for recording
purposes in accordance with
County standards.
(33) "Flood, 100 year" means a
flood of a magnitude which
will probably occur only once
in 100 years.
(34) "Flood channel" means a
natural or artificial water
course with definite bed and
banks to confine and conduct
flood water.
(35) "Forfeiture" means the
loss of ones' rights because
of a failure to abide by the
terms of an agreement.
(36) "Flood plain" means an
area of land adjoining a
river, stream, water course,
or lake, which has been or
probably would be covered with
water in the event of a 100
year flood.
(37) "Floor area" means the
sum of the areas of the
several floors of a building,
including basements,
mezzanines, and penthouses of
headroom height of six feet or
more, measured from the
exterior of walls or from the
center line of walls
separating buildings. The
floor area does not include
unoccupied features such as
pipe trenches, exterior
terraces or steps, chimneys,
and roof overhangs.
(3 8) "Foster care home" means

with a program of services
including training in
vocational and recreational
activities. To qualify, the
dwelling must be approved or
operated by the Division of
Community Services of the
State Training School or other
appropriate state agency.
(27) "Family day-care center"
means a dwelling or place of
business wherein ordinary care
and supervision are provided
during customary daytime
periods by the resident family
to non-related persons. To
qualify, the dwelling or place
of business must be approved
by the Utah State Department
of Social Services.
(28) "Farm" means a business
enterprise in which land is
used for the production of
food, feed, or fiber.
(29) "Farm Preservation
Subdivision" means a
subdivision which meets the
requirements of Section
16,04.200 ££ seq,
(30) "Fence, sight-obscuring"
means a fence having a height
of at least eight feet above
grade which permits vision
through not more than 10% of
each square foot more than
eight inches above ground.
(31) "Final plan" means a plan
of development showing the
layout and dimensions of the
streets, easements, common
areas and other features of a
development in accurate
detail, prepared in accordance
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di_~ance traversed to
horizontal distance traversec
when moving along such street
or driveway expressed in
either percentage or degree.
(41) "Grazing" means the act
of eating forage growing fror
the ground.
(42) "Guest" means a person
staying or receiving services
for compensation at a hotel,
motel, boarding house, roomi:
house, rest home, or similar
use.
(43) "Height of building"
means the weighted average
vertical distance from the
grade of the building to the
top of the building walls.
(44) "Hog farm" or "piggery"
means a tract of land and
facilities for the raising a
feeding of an average of 25
more swine for a period of
time exceeding 100 days in a
calendar year.
(45) "Home occupation" means
any occupation conducted
within a dwelling, other tha
a vacation dwelling, and
carried on by persons residi
in the dwelling.
^46) "Hospital" means a
building in which ten o r mor
ill o r injured human beings
are offered board and room
while being treated for suet
illness o r injury in
accordance with instructions
and procedures prescribed b}
persons registered to practi
the healing sciences in 'the
State of Utah.

a dwelling unit wherein room,
board, care, and supervision
are provided by the resident
family to children who are
unrelated to the resident
family under the approval and
supervision of the Utah State
Department of Social Services
or other placement agency
licensed by the s t a t e .
(39) "Fractional numbers or
measurements" means any
computation or measurement
resulting in a fractional
number will be rounded down to
the next smaller whole number;
for example, 23.75 -inches
would be rounded down to 23
inches.
( 4 0 ) "Grade":
(a) "For a building fronting
on one street only11 means the
elevation of the sidewalk or
center line of the street,
whichever is higher, at right
angles to the midpoint of the
fronting wall*
(b) "For a building fronting
on m o r e than one street" means
the average of the grades
obtained with respect to each
of the fronting streets b y
considering that the building
fronts only on each such
fronting street at a time.
(c) "For a building having no
walls fronting o n a street"
means the average level of the
sidewalk o r center line of the
closest surrounding'street,
whichever is higher.
(d) "For a street or driveway"
means the ratio of vertical
6-6

(47) "Information brochure"
means a statement setting
forth the organizational
structure of the PropertyOwners Association, and the
rights and obligations of the
owner, the developer, the
Property Owners Association,
the individual lot or home
owners, and the County.
(48) "Junk yard" means a place
where scrap, waste, discarded
or salvaged materials are
bought, sold, exchanged,
baled, packed, disassembled,
handled, or stored, including
auto wrecking yards, house
wrecking yards, used lumber
yards and places or yards for
storage of salvaged house
wrecking and structural steel
materials and equipment; but
not including places where
such uses are conducted
entirely within a completely
enclosed building or where
salvaged materials are kept
incidental to manufacturing
operations conducted on the'
premises.
(49) "Kennel" An establishment
in which dogs or cats are
housed, groomed, bred,
boarded, trained, or sold for
commercial purposes.
(50) "Landscaping" means the
application or use of some
combination of planted trees,
shrubs, vines, ground cover,
flowers, or lawns. It also
means the combination of rocks
and such structural features
as fountains, pools, art
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works, screens, walls, fences,
or hedges, but such objects
alone, in the absence of
planted trees, shrubs, ground
cover, flowers, or lawns,
shall not meet the
requirements of this code.
(51) "Land use plan" means a
plan adopted and maintained by
the planning commission which
shows how the land should be
used. The land use plan is an
element of the comprehensive
or General plan.
(52) "Large Lot Planned
Subdivision" means a
subdivision which conforms to
the requirements of Section
16.04.400 ££, seq. and
16.04.500 ££ seq,
(53) "Live waterway" means a
stream channel in which water
runs more or less continually
for a period of ten days or
more during any one calendar
year, including a river,
creek, irrigation canal and
irrigation ditch, but not
including a channel that is
dry except during rainstorms.
(54) "Livestock corral" means
a place or pen where livestock
are kept as part of an
agricultural or livestock
operation as distinguished
from a livestock feed lot.
(55) "Livestock feed lot"
means a feeding operation on a
parcel of land where livestock
are conditioned for market on
a year-round basis and where
the feed is brought to the
yard, as contrasted to feed
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obtained through grazing the
animals on the premises.
(56) "Lodging house" means a
building containing sleeping
apartments that are rented to
guests on a weekly cr monthly
basis.
(57) "Lot" or •zoning lot"
means a parcel of property
complying with all applicable
standards of the zone in which
it is situated and otherwise
fully complying with all other
requirements for the issuance
of a building permit with
respect thereto. Where the
context so requires, the term
lot shall also include parcels
of ground in a large scale
development or a planned small
subdivision, which parcels
have been approved by the
County for individual
disposition to purchasers, and
condominium units in such a
large scale development, but
only if such units are defined
as, or include, a parcel of
ground similar to other types
of lots.
(58) "Master plan*" means a
plan prepared by the County in
conformance with Utah Code §
17-27-301 or such other
similar statute.
(59) "Mobile home" means a
vehicular or portable
structure which is constructed
for movement on the public
highways and designed for use
as a residence, but which has

not been demonstrated to
conform to the requirements o
the uniform building code.
(60) "Mobile home park" means
an area or tract of land used
to accommodate two or more
mobile homes.
(61) "Nonconforming building"
means a building, structure,
or portion thereof which does
not conform to the regulation,
of this code but which legall1
existed prior to the effective
date of this code.
(62) "Nonconforming lot of
record" means a parcel of Ian
which does not conform to the
area, frontage, access, or
width requirements of this
code, but which was shown on
the records of the County
recorder, and legally existed
as an independent parcel or
two contiguous parcels prior
to the effective date of this
code and which satisfies one
of the following additional
requirements:
(a) The parcel would have
qualified for a building
permit prior to the effective
date of this code;
(b) The parcel did not qualif;
for a building permit prior t<
the effective date of this
code for the sole reason that
the parcel did not comply wit]
che access or frontage
requirements, prior to said
date, and the parcel is now
served by a travel easement o:
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the type required for a
building permit on a parcel of
agricultural land for
agricultural purposes.
(63) "Nonconforming use" means
a use of premises which does
not conform to the regulations
of this code, but which
legally existed prior co the
effective date of this code.
(64) "Off-site" means
pertaining to the territory
outside the boundaries of a
particular project.
(65) "On-site" means
pertaining to the territory
within the boundaries of a
particular project.
(66) "Open space" means land
which is not covered by
dwellings or other buildings,
or by pavement or other
impervious material which has
common ownership and is
dedicated to be used
perpetually by the owners or
the public for some other
purpose besides development.
(67) "Open space preservation
agreement" means an agreement,
in a form approved by the
County, between the County,
the owner, and the developer
in which the owner and the
developer each agrees for
himself, his successors and
assigns to preserve certain
land as open space for the
life of a development.
(68) "Owner" means, for the
purposes of Title 16 only, the

person who is the owner of
record in the office of the
County Recorder of the fee
interest in a cract of land
proposed for development as a
large scale development. Owner
shall include a mortgagee or
beneficiary under a mortgage
or deed of trust encumbering
the proposed common area in
the tract when used to
identify those persons who are
to execute the open space
preservation agreement and the
warranty deed conveying such
common area to the Property
Owners Association.
(69) "Parking space" means a
space not less than 20 feet in
length and not less than 8•5
feet in width for the parking
of a mobile vehicle, exclusive
of driveways and ramps.
(70) "Pasture" means an
enclosure for animals in which
no feed is provided except
that which the animals obtain
by grazing.
CZ1) "Planned recreation
development" means a tract of
land located in the RF-1 zone
which conforms with the
requirements of Section 16.04.
et. seq(72) "Planning commission"
means the Wasatch County
Planning Commission.
(73) "Planting plan" means a
plan showing the location and
dimensions of irrigation
equipment and curbs and other

protective features around the
edge of the planting beds, and

the location,

dimensions,

and

playgrounds" means a tract of
land which is owned by the

/ County and has been

species of plants to be
planted.
(74) "Preliminary plan" means
a plan prepared in accordance
with County standards showing
the approximate layout and
dimensions of lots, streets,
easements, common areas and
other features of a
development in sufficient
detail to give the reviewing
authority a clear and accurate
concept of the development and
what it will contain when
completed.

(75) "Premises" means a lot

or totally developed or
designated for recreational
use by the public.
(79) "Record of survey map"
means a final plat that
conforms to this code and
constitutes a record of survey
map as defined by the Utah
Condominium Ownership Act.
(80) "Rest home" means a
building for the care and
keeping of elderly or infirm
people affected with
infirmities or chronic
illness.

/ (81) "Retail

together with the buildings
and structures located
thereon.
(76) "Premises occupation"
means an occupation conducted
on any premises, except
premises containing a vacation
dwelling, by persons residing
on those premises.
(77) "Property Owners
Association" or "Home Owners
Association" means the
association of lot owners of a
project approved as a planned
recreational development under
Section 16.04.2000, or a
planned unit development under
Section 16.04.3000 for the
benefit and use of the
individual lot owners in such
development.
(78) "Public parks and

partially

drive-in"

means

any form of merchandising,
serving, or dispensing of
goods or services in which the
customer is serviced while in
his automobile.
(82) "Rooming house" means
lodging house.
(83) "Salvage yard" means junk
yard.
(84) "Septic tank" means a
tank in which the solid matter
of continuously flowing sewage
is disintegrated by bacteria.
(85) "Septic tank drainfield"
means a specified tract or
J parcel of land in which the
sewage that flows from a
septic tank is oxidized.
(86) "Setback" means the
shortest distance between a
specified line and the
foundation, wall, or main
I
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frame of a building.
j
(87) "Sign" means any device
for visual communication that
is used for the purpose of
bringing the subject thereof
to the attention of the
public, but not including a
flag pole which is used for
j
the display of the state or
J
national flag.
j
(a) "Accessory sign" means a
j
sign which directs attention
to a business or profession
conducted on the premises.
j
(b) "Area of sign" means the
area of a sign shall be
considered to include all
lettering, working and
accompanying designs or
symbols, and any background
material or free standing
supports. Where a sign
consists of individual letters
or symbols attached to or
painted on a building, wall,
or window, the area of the
sign shall be considered to be
the area of the smallest
rectangle which encompasses
all such letters or symbols.
(c) "Free-standing sign" means
a sign which is not attached
to or part of a building.
(d) "Non-accessory11 or
"billboard sign" means a sign
which directs attention to a
business, commodity, service
or entertainment that is not,
other than incidentally,
conducted, sold, or offered
such on the premises where the

sign is located.
(88) "Sleeping apartment"
means one or more rooms
designed as a unit within a
hotel, motel, boarding house,
dormitory, bunkhouse or
similar use providing sleeping
accommodations for guests.
Regardless of the structure of
the building concerned, such a
unit shall not be considered
to consist of more than two
bedrooms or two beds,
whichever is less, within such
building for the purpose of
determining the number of
sleeping apartments.
(89) "Single1 Lot: subdivision"
means a subdivision consisting
of a single building lot which
conforms with the requirements
of Section 15.04.100 fit 2£2L(90) "Slope" means the ratio
of the vertical distance moved
to the horizontal distance
moved, expressed in percentage
or degrees, when traversing
along the surface of land.
(91) "Small-lot Planned
Subdivision" means a
subdivision which conforms
with the requirements of
Section 16.04.1000 fit seq.
(92) "Small-scale subdivision"
means a subdivision which
conforms with the requirements
of Section IS.04.300fi£.seq.
(93) "Special exception" means
conditional use.
(94) "Storm, 100 Year 24 Hour
Incident" means a storm of the
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magnitude which is probable to
occur only once in 100 years.
(95) "Story" means that
portion of a building included
between the surface of a floor
and the ceiling next above it.
(96) "Street" is defined as
follows:
(a) "Paved street" means a
roadway which has been
constructed in accordance with
County standards, with respect
to durability of the surface
of the traveled part of the
roadway,
(b) "Major street" means a
road which has been designated
on the County master plan as a
collector, arterial, or other
principal thoroughfare as
distinguished from a minor
street.
(c) "Minor street" means any
dedicated street serving as
the principal means of access
to property, which street is
not shown o n the County master
plan as a principal
thoroughfare.
(d) "Private street" means a
roadway which is r used for
vehicular travel 1 to two or
more dwellings, but does not
have the status of a public
street.
(e) ^Public street" means a
roadway which has been
designated as a federal or
state highway or which has
been designated as a County
street on the official County

road map adopted by resolution
of the Councy commission.
(97) "Subdivision" means a
tract, lot or parcel of land
which has been divided into
two or more lots, plots,
sites, or other division of
land for the purpose, whether
immediate or future, of sale
or of building development;
provided that: this definition
shall not include a bona fide
division or partition of
agricultural land for
agricultural purposes or of
commercial, manufacturing or
industrial land for
commercial, manufacturing, or
industrial purposes.
(98) "Supplemental
environmental study" means a
document requested by the
Planning or County Commission
pursuant to this Title
providing additional
information regarding the
impact that a proposed
development will have on the
natural features of the
immediate area, and the social
and financial impact which the
proposed development will have
on the County as a whole.
(99) "Unnecessary hardship"
means a general restriction
placed upon a parcel with
respect to area, width, or
setback where, by reason of
exceptional narrowness,
shallowness, shape or
topography of such parcel, a
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literal enforcement of the
general restriction would
result in an unfairness to the
owner of the parcel when
compared to the owners of lots
in the same zone and where
literal enforcement would be
unnecessary in order to
achieve the intent of the
zone .

I

(100) "Vacation home" means
vacation dwelling defined in
Subsection (22)(h).
(101) "Vacation vehicle" means
a vehicle used or maintained
primarily as a temporary
dwelling for travel, vacation,
or recreation purposes.
(102) "Vacation vehicle court"
means an area or tract of land
used to accommodate two or
more vacation vehicles or
camper units for a period of
less than 30 days.
(103) "Variance" means a
waiver of an area, width, or
setback requirement, as
distinguished from a special
exception.
(104) "Waste disposal site"
means a tract of land devoted
to the disposal of solid
wastes, including garbage,
rubbish, trash and other
refuse material, but not earth
or o t h e r totally inert
materials.
(105) "Yard" means the space
on a lot with a dwelling,
unoccupied or unobstructed
except by landscaping from the

ground upward.
(a) "Front yard" means the
yard between the street
right-of-way line and the
front line of a dwelling,
exclusive of non-enclosed
steps, and extending the
entire width of the lot. O n a
corner lot, the front yard m a y
be applied to either street.
(b) "Rear yard" means the y a r d
between the rear line of a
dwelling, exclusive of all
steps, and the rear lot line
and extending for the entire
width of the lot. In the case
of a c o m e r lot where the
dwelling facade faces on the
side street, the rear yard m a y
be established from the side
of .the house to the side
property line.
(c) "Required yard" means the
yard around dwellings required
by the terms of this code.
(d) "Side yard" means the y a r d
between the side line of a
dwelling and the side lot line
and extending from the front
yard to the rear yard.
(106) "Youth group home" m e a n s
a dwelling unit wherein room,
board, ordinary care, and
supervision are provided in a
family environment by the
resident family or group h o m e
parents to persons who are
unrelated to the resident
family or group home p a r e n t s
and who are under the age of
18 years. To qualify, the
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dwelling unit must be approved
by the Jtah State Department:
of Social Services,

Map
and
all
notations,
reference and other information
shown thereon shall be as much
a part of this code as if the
matters and other information
set forth by the map were fully
described in this title. The
Official Zone Map shall be
identified by the signature of
the chairman of the County
Commission, attested no by the
County Clerk and recorded in
the
office
of
the
County
Recorder. Whenever amendments
or changes are made in zone
boundaries, such amendments or
changes shall be made promptly
by the Zoning Administrator on
the Official
Zone Map. No
amendment
or
change
shall
become effective until after it
has been properly noted and
attested to on the Official
Zone Map.

16.01-020. Violations•
Unless otherwise specified
herein, any person violating
the provisions of Title 16
shall be deemed guilty of a
class B misdemeanor.
(Ord. No. 63, Renumbered, 10/01/91,
16.01.020)

16.01.03 0. Zones Established.
In order to carry out the
purposes of this title, the
unincorporated area of Wasatch
County, Utah, is hereby
divided into zones as follows:
(1) A-l Agricultural Zone
(2) G-l Grazing Zone
(3) W.C.-l Watershed Conservation
Zone
(4) RA Residential Agricultural Zone
(5) RF-1 Recreation Forestry Zone
(6) T&S-l Trades and Services Zone
(7) C-l Commercial Zone I
(8) C-2 Commercial Zone II
(9) 1-1 Industrial Zone
(10) 1-2 Industrial Zone
(11) FPO-1 Flood Plain Overlay. Zone
(12) A-l Airport Overlay Zone
(13) FP Foothill Preservation Zone
(Ord. No. 63, Renumbered, 10/01/91,
;
16.01.030)

(Ord. No. 63, Renumbered, 10/01/91,
16.01.040)

16.01.040. Official Zone Map.

The location and boundaries of
each of the zones are shown on
the
Official
Zone
Map
of
Wasatch County, Utah, and the
map is hereby declared to be an
official record and a part of
this Code. The Official Zone

16.01.050. Boundaries of
Zones•
Where uncertainty exists with
respect to the boundaries of
various zones, the following
rules shall apply:
(1)
Where
the
indicated
boundaries on the Official Zone
Map are approximately street or
alley lines, the streets or
alleys shall be construed to be
the zone boundaries.
(2)
Where
the
indicated
boundaries are
approximately
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lot lines, the lot lines shall
be construed to be the zone
boundaries.
(3) Where indicated boundaries
are canals or rivers, the
centerline of the canals or
rivers shall be construed as
the zone boundaries.
(4) Where land has not been
subdivided into lots, the zone
boundaries shall be determined
by the use of the scale of
measurement
shown
on
the
Official Zone Map,
(5)
Where other uncertainty
exists, the Board of Adjustment
shall interpret the Official
Zone Map.

For Buildings Required.
16.02.100. Exception to Front
and Side Setback Requirements.
16.02.110.
Setbacks
from
Highways.
16.02.120. Dwelling Sites to be
Accessible by a Public Street.
16.02.130. Effect: of Street
Plan.
16.01 140, Additional Height
Allowed for Public Buildings.
16.02.150. Minimum Height of
Dwellings.

(Ord. No16.01.050)

Prevention.
16.02.210.
Concessions
in
Public Parks and Playgrounds.
16.02.220. Extraction of Earth
Products.
16.02.230. Watershed Pollution
Prevention.
16.02.240. Solid Waste Disposal
Sites.
16.02.250. Utility Buildings
and Structures Permitted in
Residential Agricultural Zone.
16.02.260. Exposed Slopes to be
Less than the Critical Angle of
Repose.
16.02.270. Fractional Numbers.
15,02.230. Agricultural Lands
for Agricultural Purposes.
16.02.290
Off-Street Parking
Standards.
16.02.300. Motor Vehicle Access
S tandards.
16.02.310.
Landscaping

S3,

Renumbered,

10/01/91,

Chapter
16.02.
General
Development
Standards
Applicable to A l l Zones.
16.02.010. I n t e n t .
16.02.020. Yard Space for_ One
Building Only.
16.02.030.Sale
or Lease of
Required Space Prohibited.
16.02.040. Every Dwelling to be
on a Zoning Lot.
16.02.050. Area of Accessory
Buildings.
16.02.060. Accessory Building
Prohibited as Living Quarters.
16.02.070. Storage of Junk and
Debris Prohibited.
16.02.080.
Yards
to
be
Unobstructed - Exceptions,
16.02.090. Additional Setbacks

16.02.150.
16.02.170.
16.02.180.
16.02.190.
16.02.20

L o c a t i o n of B a m s .
F e n c e s and W a l l s .
Drainage.
Bond.
0.
Pollution
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APPENDIX "E"
Wasatch County Code 16.04.030

be owned by the same person or
corporation which owns or
controls the operation of the
airport, or else an easement
covering the land must be
owned by the same person or
corporation which will prevent
the construction of buildings
and structures or the growing
of trees or other natural
feature over the above
prescribed height limits.
(4) Use Restrictions,
Notwithstanding any other -"
provision of this title, no
uses may be made of land
within the County which will
create electrical interference
with radio communication
between airports and aircraft;
make it difficult for flyers
to distinguish between airport
lights and others; result in
glare in the eyes of flyers
using the airport; impair
visibility in the vicinity of
airports or otherwise endanger
the landing or taking off of
aircraft.
(Ord. No. 6 2 , Renumbered, 1 0 / 0 1 / 9 1 ,
1 6 . 0 2 . 1 4 0 ; Ord. No. 66, Renumbered,
10/01/91, 16.03.140)

16.03.160". PP F p o t h i l l
P r e s e r v a t i o n Zone
(RESERVED).

Chapter 1 6 . 0 4
Residential
Development i n Zones16.04.010 . Residential
Developments a v a i l a b l e i n

zones•
Except for caretaker
dwellings allowed pursuant to
Section 16.04.280, and other
Sections of this Title, the
following are the only types
of residential developments
allowed:
(a) Single Lot Subdivisions
(Section 16.04.100)/
(b) Farm Preservation
Subdivisions (Section
16.04.200);
(c) Small S c a l e Subdivisions
(Section 16.04.300);
(d) Large Lot Planned
Subdivisions (Sections
16.04.400 and 16.04.500);
(e) Small Lot Planned
Subdivisions (Sections
16.04.1000);
(f) Planned Residential
Deve1opment s (S e ct ions
16.04.1700); and
(g)
Recreational
Developments(Section
16.04.2000) .
16.04.020 . Specific
Requirements. Specific
requirements for each type of
residential development are
"Contained in this chapter.
Building permits shall not be
issued for dwelling units
which would be in violation of
this Title.
16.04.030. Sale,
Advertisement, or Offering for
Sale of Lots in Unapproved
Subdivisions Prohibited.
Lot(s) in a subdivision that
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has not received final
approval according to the
requirements contained in this
Title may not be sold,
advertised for sale, or"
offered for sale in any
manner.
16.04.040. Minimum Lot Size.
Except as specifically
provided otherwise in this
Title, the minimum lot size
allowed for a dwelling unit in
Wasatch County is one(l) acre.
16.04.050. Water Required for
Residential Development.
(1) Each residential
development proposed in
Wasatch County must have safe
and adequate culinary water
ufficient to-meet the water
*ieeds of the development
according to State and local
ordinance. It is the
responsibility of the
developer to conclusively
establish the availability Q £
culinary water and its
dedication to the proposed
residential development prior
to final approval.
(2) Except for single lot
subdivisions, farm
preservation subdivisions, or
small scale subdivisions any
residential development
containing lot(s) smaller than
five(5) acres in size is
required to connect each lot
to a culinary water system if

any of the property in the
proposed development is
located in a Special Service
District organized for the
purpose of supplying culinary
water.
(3) Except for single lot
subdivi s i ons, f arm
preservation subdivisions, or
small scale subdivisions, any
residential development
containing lotts) smaller*" than
2.5 acres in size is required
to connect each lot in the
residential development to a
culinary water system.
(4) Except for single lot
subdivisions, farm
preservation subdivisions, or
small scale subdivisions, any
residential development
containing lot(s) smaller than
2.5 acres in size is required
to connect each lot in the
residential development to a
secondary water system for
outside and/or livestock
watering.
(5) Any residential
development required to
connect to a culinary water
system pursuant to this Title
shall also be required to
provide fire flow protection
to each lot in the residential
development as set forth in
the applicable statute or
ordinance.
(6) Except for caretaker
dwellings and lots in farm
preservation subdivisions, and
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